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Deregulation Of Broadcasting in the
United States: Quo Vadimus?
Erwin G. Krasnow* and Michael Botein**
Introduction

'

-

As in other areas of US governmental activity, the
dominant ideology of broadcast policymakers has
changed from the New Deal's social welfare orientation
to 'Chicago School' economics. This reasoning assumes
that an open market-place inevitably produces competition among suppliers, which creates the greatest possible
consumer satisfaction. Any type of governmental regulation thus is an anathema to the Chicago School, except in
the case of a natural monopoly.
In terms of the mass media, this ideological change
translates into the perhaps internally inconsistent notion
of 'market-place regulation' - that is, the removal
of government intervention in the operation of broadcast stations. Since the late 1970s, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), with a little help
from its friends in Congress, has engaged in a programme of first 'reregulation', then 'deregulation' and
now 'unregulation'.
No sane person favours unnecessary regulation, of
course, particularly in an area as fraught with free speech
considerations as broadcasting. However, as the House
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance suggested in a 1981 Report, 'deregulation is not an end in or of itself .' It is less than clear
whether the FCC's recent deregulatory actions achieve
their professed goal of substituting open and effective
competition in the market-place for government
regulation.
Although the Congress has the ultimate federal
control over broadcast policy, it has influenced the
Commission's regulatory philosophy only indirectly.
From 1976 to 1980, Representative Lionel Van Deerlin,
Chairman of the House Communications Subcommittee, pressed for a 'basement to attic' rewrite of the
Communications Act.2 Although Van Deerlin's rewrite
bill never passed the House, the introduction of other
bills and the resulting debate on them has had a significant impact on communications policy. For example,
Congressional oversight of the FCC's actions improved.
Former FCC Commissioner Glen Robinson has
observed:
'As part of a studied effort over the last two years [1976
1977] to review and revise the entire legislative mandate
of the FCC, the Subcommittee on Communications and
its staff have shown greater attentiveness to, and more
understanding of, important policy issues than has been
evident for at least twenty years ....
By threatening the FCC's survival, the rewrite proposals
spurred the agency to action. The Commission adopted
major decisions deregulating radio,' cable televisions
#*
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and satellite earth stations.' To provide new broadcasting
outlets, the FCC 'dropped in' four new VHF television
channels,' created a new low power television (LPTV)
service,8 and authorised a direct-to-home broadcast
satellite (DBS) service.' Van Deerlin and many other
observers concluded that the FCC's bold actions 'would
have been impossible without the thunder and lightning
sparked by those first two comprehensive bills'." In fact,
the Commission has implemented administratively many
of the rewrite bills deregulatory goals, thus taking some
of the steam out of the drive for legislation.
At the same time, some of the Commission's deregulatory efforts may have created some unexpected and
negative side effects. An overview and analysis of broadcast deregulation thus may be useful.

The FCC'S implementation of
market-place regulation
A. Changes in FCC regulatory philosophy
The FCC initially embraced market-place regulation
during the regime of FCC Chairman Charles Ferris,
who served during President Carter's term. Ferris transformed the FCC's office of Plans and Policy into an

office of 'Chief Economist', and introduced a substantial
number of economists into the highest levels of FCC
decision making. This created an opportunity to
challenge past legal structures for broadcast regulation
with open entry for new technologies. Ferris' legacy
includes the Network Inquiry Special Staff Report,
which has served as the basis of many recent deregulatory
initiatives.
The next Chairman, Mark Fowler, was appointed by
President Reagan, and he also has endorsed an open
entry philosophy. Fowler advocates a market-place
approach under which broadcasters are viewed not as
public trustees, but as market-place competitors.
As a result of these new regulatory philosophies, the
Commission has consolidated regulation of all video
services in a new Mass Media Bureau, which includes
'branches' for cable, broadcast television, LPTV, DBS
and other new technologies." The FCC believes that this
consolidation will lead to more efficient processing of
licenses, reduction of duplicative record-keeping, less
confusion among consumers, more flexible staff utilisation and more orderly development of emerging video
technologies. The Commission's recent delays in processing applications for new FM and LPTV stations,
however, cast some doubt over the success of this
management technique. Moreover, this approach
creates some doctrinal fuzziness, since it places under

Member, Verner, Liipfert, Bernard, McPherson and Hand, Washington, D.C.
Co-Director, Center for Telecommunications and Information Studies, Graduate School of Business, Columbia
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one administrative roof both broadcast (e.g. conventional
television) and common carrier (e.g. DBS) services.
B. Deregulation of radio and television
In its radio deregulation proceeding" the Commission
eliminated its internal processing guidelines, which had
required full Commission consideration of any renewal
application either proposing less than eight per cent (for
AM stations) or six per cent (for FM stations) nonentertainment programming, or proposing more than 18
minutes of advertisements per hour. Although theoretically not substantive rules, these guidelines had been
followed by all broadcasters; failure to comply guaranteed at best an expensive FCC proceeding and at worst a
denial of a licence renewal. Formalistic requirements for
'ascertainment' of community leaders and for a general
survey of the public also were eliminated for commercial
radio licensees, as was the Commission's programme log
requirement.
These Commission actions were upheld by the US
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 1983.13 The
court held that the Commission's prior requirements had
not been mandated by the Communications Act, but
rather had been created solely by the Commission's
direction. Though the court held that the Communications Act did not compel the FCC to require programme
logs, it directed the Commission to give further consideration to that issue - particularly to alternative ways
of permitting the public to assess a station's performance
and the agency to monitor the results of its deregulatory
regime."
The court approved the Commission's reliance upon
market conditions in the radio industry to justify deregulation. The FCC particularly had noted the radio
industry's explosive growth - especially in terms of
increases in the number of FM stations and of alternative
sources for informational programming. The Commission stressed that the greater number of outlets had
increased specialisation and competition in the radio
market-place. The Commission concluded that radio had
become a specialised medium, offering programming
geared to narrower audiences than in the past."
Under its public interest mandate, the FCC maintained that it was compelled to review its regulations to
reflect changes in the radio industry. Indeed, it observed
that 'failure to do so could constitute less than adequate
performance of our regulatory mission'." In addition to
establishing the Commission's authority to adapt its
regulations to industry changes, the court also recognised that market-place forces would force licensees to
provide program diversity in some situations. Whether
the Commission would repeal any and all broadcast
regulations, however, is less than clear; at least some of
them have strong statutory bases.
In this regard, FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild" is also
significant. The Supreme Court there upheld the Commission's refusal to review radio format changes in
licence renewal or transfer cases. Calling to market the
'allocation mechanism of preference', the Commission
had found that competition already had produced a
'bewildering array of diversity' in entertainment
formats.'" In the Commission's view, the market was
more flexible than government regulation and responded
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more quickly to changing public tastes. The Supreme
Court agreed by holding that the FCC's statutory duties
are 'best fulfilled by not attempting to oversee format
changes'."
The FCC also has tried to encourage diversity by
authorising a new low power television (LPTV) service,
which will create several thousand new stations with five
to ten mile service radii. The FCC again relied upon
'market-place forces' to fulfil many of the policy objectives underlying conventional broadcast regulation.2 0
Creation of LPTV in turn justified further deregulation
of other services such as radio. This type of regulatory
'Catch-22' makes eminently good sense if authorisation
of new stations actually leads to new services; in the case
of LPTV this may not be the case, however, since few
stations have become financially viable.
The Commission adopted minimal programming
requirements for the new LPTV service. LPTV stations
thus did not need to comply with the formal ascertainment, minimum hours of operation, commercial time,
and programming requirements which applied untilJune
1984 to full service television stations. The Commission
reasoned that 'government surveillance' of LPTV
stations would interfere with market-place conditions.
Given LPTV stations' limited coverage areas, the FCC
concluded that LPTV stations had to be sensitive to local
needs in order to survive. The technical nature of the
new service, the Commission observed, also warranted a
departure from the general mandate of providing programming to all elements of a community. The agency
therefore left programming decisions to the discretion of
licensees and to the demands of the market-place.
The Commission also adopted flexible ownership
policies for the new service, by deleting restrictions on
ownership of LPTV stations by existing local broadcast
licensees. Because of the new service's uncertain viability, the FCC concluded that cross-ownership would
be outweighed by the benefit of permitting experienced
broadcasters to develop the service initially.
Precisely because of most LPTV stations' small coverage areas and remote locations, some observers believe
that their economic viability is marginal at best, and that
they are just a gesture towards diversity. Indeed, some
FCC staff members refer to LPTV informally as 'toy
television'.
On another front, in 1983 the FCC ended a 13-year
inquiry into children's television by declining to require a
minimum amount of children's programming. Instead,
the Commission stressed each licensee's continuing duty
to respond to the needs of the child audience. The
Commission disagreed with the Children's Television
Task Force's conclusion that the economic incentives
of the advertiser-supported broadcasting system discouraged production of specialised programming for
children. In particular, the Commission found that the
Task Force had failed to consider (1) the growth in the
number of commercial stations; (2) programming on
non-commercial stations; (3) cable television programmes; and (4) child viewing of 'family' television. The
growth of alternative video outlets, the Commission
noted, tended to result in market segmentation and
greater attention to specific subgroups such as the child
audience.
57

C. Deregulation of subscription television
Subscription television (STV) stations operate on conventional television channels, but offer scrambled 'pay'
programming, which is receivable only by subscribers
with decoding equipment. STV stations generally charge
about fifteen dollars per month for a mixture of recently
released movies and live sporting events. Cable television
naturally presents major competition to STV; the recent
failure of many STV stations once their markets were
wired for cable indicated that STV may not have a long
life expectancy.
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Part of the problem may stem from the Commission's
past restrictions on STV, because it feared that STV
would kill off 'free' advertiser-supported television.
Recognising this counter-productive effect, the FCC
recently deregulated STV substantially, in order to give
free rein to market-place forces. To this end, the Commission: (1) eliminated the 'complement-of-four' rule,
which restricted STV operations to communities with at
least four other commercial television stations; (2)
deleted the requirement that STV stations broadcast at
least 28 hours of free programming per week; (3) allowed
STV operators to sell as well as lease decoders; and (4)
relieved STV licensees from any obligation to identify
community needs as to STV programming.27 More
recently, the Commission exempted STV stations from
conventional television signal quality standards,28 on the
theory that consumers could vote with their dollars for
quality signals.
The 'complement-of-four' rule originally was adopted
to assure that pay television would not replace an existing
free service or utilise a vacant channel that otherwise
would be available for a conventional station. As the
Commission later found, however, market conditions
protected conventional programming from harm in
eliminating the rule. Moreover, the Commission observed that the rule placed STV licensees at a competitive disadvantage vis-1-vis pay cable operators, by preventing them from entering markets before cable did.
The '28 hour' rule also was designed to ensure the
availability of free programming. In deleting this requirement, the FCC noted that the 'mix of conventional and
pay programming might better be determined by the
judgment of the individual entrepreneur and the
demands of the market-place,' rather than by 'an
arbitrary government rule'. 29 The Commission believed
that the rule did not serve the public interest, and that its
elimination would result in greater programming diversity by enabling a licensee to respond to audience
demands.
The FCC's analysis of the video market-place led to
other elements of STV deregulation. It authorised STV
licensees and other entities to sell decoders because
other terminal equipment for pay technologies
primarily cable television - was available on a lease or
purchase basis. Elimination of ascertainment obligations
for STV licensees also reflected a market-place
approach.
Deregulation of STV is signified in its assumption that
STV competes with alternative forms of home video
entertainment such as cable, pay cable and MDS, and
that the STV licensee should be on an equal footing with
its competitors. Whether STV can compete with multichannel media is far from clear, as evidenced by the many
recent failures of STV stations. For STV, deregulation
may have been too little and too late.
-

-

Finally, in June 1984, the Commission deregulated
television by eliminating minimum programme percentages, ascertainment requirements, commercial time
standards and programme log rules for commercial television stations 22 - thus paralleling the rule changes previously adopted for radio. When it began the proceeding
a year earlier, the Commission had announced an intention 'to evaluate the market-place to determine whether
the public interest can be furthered by competitive forces
rather than by the Commission's existing rules and
policies'.2 3 While inviting comment on several options
ranging from substantial to nominal deregulation - the
Commission ultimately chose the most extreme revisions,
reflecting its faith in market-place regulation.
In justifying its action, the FCC noted several factors.
First, it pointed to the increasingly competitive nature
of the video market-place. Second, it observed that
changing competitive conditions might inhibit television's ability to compete with other unregulated or less
regulated technologies. Third, the Commission relied
upon Congress's strong national policy against government regulation, as reflected in the Paperwork Reduction and Regulatory Flexibility Acts. Fourth, the FCC
noted that the rules presented a particularly compelling
case for reassessment, because the programming guidelines and commercialisation policies related to the sensitive content control issues. Finally, the Commission
pointed out that broadcasters apparently were presenting
more informational, local and non-entertainment programming than required and less commercial material
than permitted.
The Commission also instituted a proceeding in 1984
to re-examine the fairness doctrine obligations of broadcast licensees." (The fairness doctrine requires broadcasters to cover 'controversial issues of public importance,' and to provide reasonable opportunities for the
presentation of contrasting viewpoints on such issues.)2 5
In initiating its re-examination of the 35-year-old policy,
the FCC noted that 'significant new developments and
changes in the electronic and print media over the past
decade have contributed to an extremely dynamic,
robust, and diverse market-place of ideas that may call
into question the continued necessity of the doctrine as a
means of insuring the attainment of First Amendment
objective'.26 Because of strong political opposition from
many members of Congress - who naturally had an
inherent interest in obtaining free reply time - the FCC
shelved its proposed repeal in late 1985. In a plea for
legislative help, the Commission stated that it lacked
jurisdiction to repeal the statutorily-based doctrine, but
urged Congress to do so.

D. Technical standards
Traditionally, the FCC has set technical standards for
both transmitting and receiving equipment, not only to
prevent interference, but also to protect consumers. The
FCC's recent decisions on technical standards reflect its
belief that the market-place should determine these
issues. For new communications services, the CommisMEDIA LAW & PRACTICE. JULY 1986

sion merely has established minimum performance standards. In the case of existing services, the FCC has begun
to examine the validity of many technical standards, and
has proposed to retain some of these standards only as
voluntary guidelines.
For example, after a half-decade of deliberations, the
FCC decided to allow the market-place to choose an AM
stereo system for the US. Faced with five inconsistent
systems proposed by five competing manufacturers,
the Commission simply set minimum performance
standards that all five systems could meet.o
The FCC recognised that the result of its refusal to
choose might be that no system would be adopted widely
enough to sustain AM stereo. But the Commission preferred this outcome to endorsing a particular technical
system in order to encourage its adoption. In the FCC's
view, governmental interference with normal market
development was justifiable only in extraordinary
circumstances. The Commission observed:
'A very strong case would have to be made in order to
override the inherent benefits of consumers making their
own choices rather than having their decisions made by
the government ...

[O]ur society generally had not seen

fit to supplant the free decisions of consumers with those
imposed by government, and there is no convincing
reason why AM radio represents a special case.'
The Commission employed a similar 'open marketplace'
approach in authorising direct broadcast satellites. It
declined to impose technical standards upon DBS, since
such standards might have stifled development of the
service.32 The FCC stated that a flexible approach would
permit DBS operators to respond to technological
advances and encourage the introduction of new
services. This debate naturally is somewhat theoretical
now, since all proposed DBS operators have abandoned
their plans and withdrawn their applications.
In authorising videotex transmissions by conventional
broadcast stations, the Commission similarly left the
choice of technical systems to individual licensees." The
FCC pointed out that a market-place approach would
allow licensees to tailor videotex service to their own
specific need and to respond to changes in demand. In
the Commission's view, a market-place approach provided the best mechanism for resolving the trade-offs
among system features and prices - decisions that are
extremely difficult for regulators. The FCC also believed
that its hands-off approach would hasten introduction of
the service, by avoiding years of administrative delay in
specifying uniform standards.
A market-place approach also emerged in the
Commission's authorisation of multichannel television
sound (popularly referred to as 'TV stereo')." Consistent
with its AM stereo, DBS and videotex decisions, the
FCC declined to select a uniform technical system.
Instead, it opted to 'allow the processes of change and
development associated with both user preference and
technology to evolve unencumbered by the costs
and delays associated with changing government regulations'." The Commission also proposed to impose
technical rules on TV aural subcarriers only to the extent
necessary to ensure integrity of service and to preclude
interference.
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The Commission's approval of TV stereo was relatively painless because of careful planning by the private
sector. Unlike AM stereo, the TV stereo proceeding was
marked by general industry agreement. Through the
Multichannel Sound Subcommittee of the Electronic
Industries Association, industry representatives presented the FCC with a proposed uniform technical
system, known as the Broadcast Television Systems
Committee (BTSC) system. The Commission sought to
balance the investment of BTSC receiver owners with
the opportunity for market-place advances in technology,
by insuring that BTSC receivers do not respond to nonBTSC signals.
In another development affecting technical standards,
the Commission instituted a proceeding in April of 1983
to eliminate many of its technical rules and policies.
The FCC proposed to delete all transmission system
requirements for AM, FM and television stations, and
began an inquiry into the continued usefulness of rules
on: minimum performance standards for equipment and
services; equipment inter-operability requirements;
interference control regulations; and spectrum efficiency
rules.
E. Ownership rules and policies
The Commission's ownership rules have attempted to
insure diversification of control over the media and promote ideological as well as economic diversity.37 The
Commission has revised several significant ownership
rules and policies under the market-place rationale.
1. Eliminationofthe 'Trafficking'Rule
In late 1982, the Commission deleted the 'trafficking'
rule, which had required that broadcast licences be held
for at least three years before being sold." The Commission concluded that in a new competitive environment
the public interest was served best by allowing marketplace forces to regulate station sales. Under the new
approach, buyers of broadcast licences no longer must
hold their licences for a particular period before selling
those licences at a profit."
Chairman Fowler characterised this decision as 'a true
blockbuster in the unregulation process'. Consistent with
Chairman Fowler's view, the Commission's trafficking
decision finds profit and public service to be compatible.
Whether this approach would be well received if large
numbers of stations were resold frequently, however,
remains to be seen. Congress might intervene in the
creation of a future market for broadcast stations.
Responding to the concern that 'a licensee who
acquired a station with a primary interest in imminent
resale would work to increase the station's resale value
rather than making a meaningful effort to provide programming in the public interest', the Commission
observed that market-place forces would militate against
such a result. '[1In broadcasting, like any other business,
important services can be performed by people who trade
broadcast properties, rehabilitate ailing stations with new
capital and ideas or relieve unwilling licensees of the
responsibility of running a station they no longer want.'4
2. Modificationofthe OwnershipAttributionRules
In 1984 the FCC comprehensively changed its rules
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specifying the ownership interests in broadcast, cable
television and newspaper properties that will be
considered - that is, 'attributed' to a party - in deter-

mining whether media transactions violate its multiple
and cross-ownership rules and policies. The new rules
shrink the amount and type of interests which are attributed to a party under the Commission's multiple and
cross-ownership rules. Prompting the revisions was the
Commission's recognition that the industry and the
investment community have changed dramatically, as
well as the FCC's belief that relaxing the benchmark
'might serve the public interest by increasing investment
in the industry and by promoting the entry of new participants, particularly minorities, by increasing the availability of start-up capital'.' The Commission thus
assumed that modifying the rules would attract passive
investors to new technologies and minority group ventures, through arrangements such as limited partnerships and preferred stock.
3. Eliminationofthe 'Top-50'Policy
In addition to its cross and common ownership restrictions, in the past the FCC also attempted to limit concentration of station ownership in the nation's largest and
most lucrative markets. The 'Top-50' Policy required
entities seeking to acquire a fourth TV station (either
UHF or VHF) or a third VHF station in the 50 largest
television markets to show that the benefit of the acquisition would 'overcome the detriment with respect to the
policy of diversifying the sources of mass media communications to the public'." The policy's effectiveness
was somewhat questionable, however, since most waiver
requests got rubber-stamp approval. In abolishing this
policy, the FCC heavily emphasised that changes in the
video market-place had lessened concentration levels in
the 50 largest markets.
The Commission noted that the creation of new video
outlets such as LPTV and the existence of the other
ownership rules tended to foster diversity of program
voices on the local and national levels. Based on an
analysis of economic concentration in the top 50 markets
since 1968, the Commission found no trend toward
concentration. To the contrary, the Commission noted
that 'the top fifty markets are the very markets with the
greatest number of competing voices, so that each
owner's expected share of that potential audience will be
much less.'"
4. Modification ofthe '7-7-7 'Restrictions
Almost since time immemorial, the Commission has
limited the total number of broadcast stations which a
single entity may own. Under the old 'seven-station' rule,
no company could have more than seven AM stations,
seven FM stations and seven TV stations (only five of
which could be VHF). Although the multiple ownership
rules had seemed untouchable, in July 1984, the Commission adopted a six-year phase-out of them under a
transitional limitation of 12 AM, 12 FM and 12 TV
(whether VHF or UHF) stations.s As initially proposed
by the FCC, at the end of six years multiple ownership
would be unrestricted, unless experience showed that
FCC involvement was necessary to prevent undue
concentration.
Following the FCC's action, several members of
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Congress requested that the rule changes as to television
be suspended, to permit review and reconsideration of
the issues. Responding to this strong Congressional
interest, the FCC modified the rule to prevent any television entity from reaching more than 25 per cent of the
nation's viewers." The FCC also eliminated the six-year
phase-out, and provided for ownership of up to 14
broadcast stations and an audience reach of up to 30 per
cent for minority group-controlled entities.
In relaxing the multiple ownership rules, the FCC
emphasised that it was retaining its local 'one-to-amarket' as well as 'duopoly' restrictions, and that it would
defer to the Department ofJustice and the Federal Trade
Commission in challenges to particular acquisitions. In
their final form, the multiple ownership restrictions incorporate limits on the ownership of radio and/or television stations based upon a national economic concentration index measured in terms of audience shares.
In modifying the seven-station rule, the Commission
again relied upon changes in the video market-place
since 1953, when the 7-7-7 rules were adopted. These
market-place changes rendered the rules 'obsolete' in
the FCC's view. Underlying the FCC's decision was the
belief that multiple at the national level would not reduce
the number of independently owned radio, TV and cable
outlets available to the consumer, and might create
economies of scale.
5. Rejection ofLimitationson Multiple Ownership ofCable
Systems
Shortly before loosening the multiple ownership restrictions for broadcasters, the FCC declined to adopt similar
rules for cable operators. The Commission concluded
that 'while the amount of concentration in the cable
television industry is increasing, it is still not a concentrated industry'." The FCC relied largely upon reports
by its Network Inquiry Special Staff and Office of Plans
and Policy. The Commission also noted that it had
reviewed - and consistently approved - merger proposals

by cable television operators. Moreover, the Commission
expressed concern that multiple ownership limits would
limit economies of scale. Consistent with these studies
and with the growth of the new video media, the
Commission concluded that multiple ownership limitations for cable television were unnecessary.
6. RepealofLimitations on Regional Ownership ofBroadcast
Stations
In April of 1984, the FCC repealed the regional
concentration-of-control rules,4 9 which had prohibited
the acquisition of a broadcast facility which resulted in
common ownership ofthree stations, where any two were
within 100 miles of the third and any of the three had
primary service contour overlap with another.o
In initially proposing to eliminate the rules, the FCC
relied upon changes in the telecommunications marketplace." As a result of these changes, the Commission
stated, 'the potential influence of any given combination
of commonly owned outlets is diluted and our concern
with the impact of such combinations on diversity and
levels of competition declines accordingly'.52 The Commission ultimately concluded that market-place
developments and the continued applicability of the
duopoly as well as the one-to-a-market rules had
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obviated the need for regional ownership restrictions.
The FCC also noted that the rules created administrative
burdens and opportunity costs.

Conclusion
As the above review indicates, during the past few years
the Commission has been hacking away vigorously at
broadcasting's regulatory underbrush. In its fervour to
'reregulate', 'deregulate' and 'unregulate', however, the
FCC may not have considered some of its actions' side
effects, a phenomenon characterised by the regulatory
cognoscenti as the 'law of unintended consequence'.
Although these effects do not necessarily counterbalance
the benefits of deregulation, their weight must be thrown
onto the policy making scales.
First, the Commission may turn out to have a bit too
much upon the arrival of the new video technologies as a
cure-all. To begin with, the scope and vitality of the new
media are less than clear.s" STV stations are encountering stiff multi-channel competition from cable
systems and MMDS. Most LPTV stations have tiny
audiences. And most plans for DBS are on hold. The
much-heralded new video market-place thus must boil
down to the continued growth of cable television and the
strong sales of video-cassette recorders (VCRs).
Whether either cable systems or VCRs are effective
competition for broadcasting, however, is less than clear.
On the one hand, cable is a passive medium and produces little or no programming. On the other, it has
facilitated the development of several dozen new satellite
services - ranging from the Cable News Network to the
Christian Broadcasting Network - which supply diverse
programming to cable subscribers. And although VCRs
provide access to otherwise unavailable material, they
inherently cannot offer news or current events. Moreover, the cost of both cable and VCRs will keep them
beyond the means of many US viewers for the foreseeable future.
Second, the FCC's forebearance from regulation may
frustrate the formation of a competitive market-place in
some situations. Indeed, the current chaos in AM stereo

seems to flow largely from the Commission's refusal to
adopt uniform technical standards. It now appears that
consumers may not get the opportunity the FCC had in
mind for them, namely of 'voting' with their dollars for
the best system. Similar problems have delayed implementation of teletext. The Commission's accommodation of an industry-recommended standard for multichannel television sound, however, signals a partial
retreat from the pure market-place approach espoused in
the AM stereo proceedings, and reflects a recognition
that the market may require FCC-selected standards to
protect customers. The FCC may have overlooked the
fact that regulation can be a means of making as well as
policing a market.
Finally, deregulation can be a double-edged sword.
The mere existence of an administrative rule often deters
litigation within an industry. On a legal level, US courts
usually refuse to hear cases against regulated firms if a
plaintiff's claim is covered by a regulation, on theories of
'primary administrative jurisdiction' or 'exhaustion of
administrative remedies'. Deregulation thus often leads
to litigation, as both a firm's competitors and members of
the public turn to the courts with their grievances. Moreover, litigation not only is much more expensive in terms
of legal fees than agency proceedings, but also has much
greater risks - e.g. awards of treble damages and attorney's fees under the antitrust laws. Although it is impossible to quantify developments at this early stage of
deregulation, the amount of litigation - particularly antitrust litigation - in the communications field seems to
have increased substantially during the past few years.
Precisely for this reason, some communications practitioners view deregulation as a 'Lawyer's Relief Act'.
The benefits and burdens of deregulation thus are not
clear. As the old baseball saying goes, 'it ain't over 'til it's
over ... ', and the process of deregulation is far from over.
On the positive side of the ledger, deregulation has
unleashed some dynamic competitive forces, which previously had been caged by artificial or obsolete rules. On
the negative side, however, the full implications of these
changes only now have begun to play out. The bottom
line is still unknown.
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